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TERMINATIONS IN FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
PA L H. GAnTT* AND JAMEs A. COHEN**
FoREwoRD
At the outset, it should be noted, this article will reflect a noticeable
general trend in the field of Federal Government contracting and
procurement. There are only a handful of opinions of the Supreme
Court of the United States and of the Court of Claims dealing with
termination and there are only a few, but very helpful, opinions by the
Comptroller General. On the other hand, there are literally hundreds
of decisions of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals on this
subject. No precise statistics are available, but the writers estimate that
about 8% of all opinions issued by the ASBCA concern terminations.
These decisions deal with almost every aspect of termination problems
and of the applicable regulations.
There is another phenomenon which can be best described by the
experience of Mr. Gantt in the Department of the Interior. During
his sixteen years of service with that Department, not more than five
terminations for default were issued in that Department. Until Mr.
Gantt negotiated complicated multi-million dollar contracts for the
Bureau of Mines, the Geological Survey, and the Office of Saline
Water, no contract was ever written to include a termination for
convenience clause.
As Chairman of the Interior Board of Contract Appeals, Mr. Gantt
participated in about 300 contract appeals. Only two of those appeals
concerned terminations. In one, the appeal of Foster Wheeler Cor-
poration,' the contract was terminated for default in 1953 and had
been pending before the Interior Board of Contract Appeals since 1955.
The appeal was disposed of in 1959, when Mr. Gantt, as hearing
* Chairman, Board of Contract Appeals, Atomic Energy Commission since 1964.
Former Chairman, Board of Contract Appeals, Department of the Interior, 1959-1964.
Former Procurement Counsel, Department of the Interior, 1958-1959. J.UD. University
of Vienna, Austria, 1931; B.C.L., College of William and Mary, 1942.
** Legal Assistant, Board of Contract Appeals, Atomic Energy Commission, since
1964. Formerly Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Atomic Energy Commission.
BSc. (1959); J.D. (1962) University of Iowa.
The opinions expressed by the writers express only their own views, and do not repre-
sent the views of the Atomic Energy Commission.
1. IBCA-61, 67 I.D. 22, 60-1 BCA 2481 (1960).
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official at the preheating conference, dictated a tentative opinion in the
record.2
The long pendency of this termination action shows the effect of the
absence of contract administration experience in the field. It is our
hope that this article may provide some guidance to both contractors
and contracting officers when they are faced with a termination
situation.
James A. Cohen
TERMINATIoN TEcHmuES AND PROCEDURES
In 1875, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Corliss Steam
Engine Co.,3 a case dealing with the termination of Government con-
tracts. The Court held that the authority of the United States Govern-
ment to enter into contracts carried with it the power to cancel such
contracts when cancellation was determined to be in the best interests
of the Government.4 Since Corliss, the termination techniques and
provisions have developed until at the present time both the Federal
Procurement Regulations5 (FPR) and the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations' (ASPR), as well as many of the supplementing and im-
plementing regulations of other agencies,7 provide comprehensive guid-
ance for the use of termination provisions and the administration of
2. 67 I.D. 23. This opinion was approved by the Comptroller General in Dec. Comp.
Gen. B-119159 (June 20, 1960) and therefore represents a valuable tool for the many
Government agencies which do not include termination for convenience clauses in
their contracts. The views expressed in Foster Wheeler were subsequently included in
the FPRs in § 1-8.201(c).
3. 91 U.S. 321 (1875). This case involved the validity of a settlement entered into be-
tween the Secretary of the Navy and a contractor. Although this case makes it clear
that the Government has a right to terminate a contract, it does not concern itself with
the rights and obligations of the parties once the termination has been achieved.
4. Absent a statutory or contractual right, the authorities are in agreement that the
Government would be liable for a breach of contract to the same extent as any other
contracting party. See, CuNwo, GovEaNMENT CoN-Acts HANmaooK 112 (1962). Cf.
United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338 (1884) in which the Government ordered the
stoppage of work due to no fault of the contractor and the court awarded the con-
tractor damages.
5. FPR 1-8, 41 C.FR. Part 1-8.
6. ASPR Section VIII, 32 C.F.R. Chapter 1, Part 8.
7. See, Atomic Energy Commission Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. Part 9-8,
Department of Agriculture Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. Part 4-8, National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration Procurement Regulations, 32 C.F.R. Part 18-8. (How-
ever, many of the agencies have not issued implementing regulations in the termination
area). See, Federal Aviation Agency Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. Chapter 2;
General Services Administration Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. Chapter 5; De-
partment of the Interior Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. Chapter 14.
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termination procedures. Since both of the writers are most familiar
with the FPRs they have been used as the primary reference with the
knowledge that there are some differences, although generally not of a
substantive nature, between the FPRs and the ASPRs.
The purpose of termination provisions is to eliminate some of the
uncertainties which would arise upon the termination of a contract.
As a tool of administrative convenience serving to facilitate termination
and settlement of contractual obligations, they are invaluable; However,
as is the case with all contract articles, they do not solve all of the
problems.
Termination provisions of Government contracts come in two
varieties, i.e. "Termination for Defaule' and "Termination for Con-
venience." Of course, appropriate modifications of each are used de-
pending on the type of contract, such as supply contract, construction
contract, and research and development contract and the method of
payment, i.e., fixed price or cost type.
While the- invocation of the termination for default procedures
assumes the failure of performance by the contractor, the use of ter-
mination for convenience procedures assumes no grounds for default
exist, but that for good reason the Government desires to terminate,
in whole or in part, the contractual relationship. Of course the choice
of termination for default or termination for convenience will ma-
terially affect the duties and obligations of both parties. Under a default
termination, although the Government is liable for supplies which have
been delivered and accepted, the Government will not be liable for
the contractor's cost of undelivered work." In addition, the Govern-
ment has the right to repayment of advance payments or progress
payments9 ; and, by specific provision in the default clause, the con-
tractor will be liable for the costs of repurchasing "similar" articles"
and further may be liable for damages for breach of contract.,'
If the contractor can persuade the contracting officer to issue a termi-
nation for convenience, it is certainly in his best interest to do so. Under
this provision, the contractor will be entitled to recover performance
costs plus profit on work performed. Although the settlement under
the termination for convenience article may approach the contract
price, it cannot exceed it.'2
8. See, FPR 1-8.602-2.
9. Ibid.
10. See paragraph (b) of the standard clause.
11. Rumley v. United States, 285 F.2d 773 (Ct. CL 1961).
12. See FPR 1-8308.
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TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT
The standard termination for default clause for Fixed-Price Supply
Contracts is set out in ASPR 8-707 and FPR 1-8.707. The procedures
to be followed where there is a default termination of a fixed-price
contract are provided for in ASPR 8-602 and FPR 1-8.602. In any
fixed-price construction contract estimated to exceed $10,000 the default
clause set forth in ASPR 8-709 and FPR 1-8.709-1 is required to be
used.13 When the amount of the contract is estimated not to exceed
$10,000, the clause set forth in ASPR 8-709 and FPR 1-8.709-2 is
used. 4 The FPR section providing procedures for default termination
of fixed-price construction contracts is 1-8.603 and the similar ASPR
provision is ASPR 8-602 which provides procedures for both construc-
tion and supply contracts. Although the discussion of default termina-
tion has been divided into two major sections, i.e., Fixed-Price Supply
Contracts and Fixed-Price Construction Contracts, many of the prin-
ciples applicable to each are similar or identical; therefore, many of the
cases discussed in the first portion of the article may have been decided
under the construction contract clause.
FIXED-PRICE SUPPLY CoNTRAcTs: THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE
The standard termination for default clause found in fixed-price
supply contracts provides that the Government "may" terminate the
contract for (1) failure of the contractor to deliver or perform the
services within the time specified in the contract,"3 (2) failure to perform
13. FPR 1-8.700-2(b) (4). For the purpose of this article discussion of the standard
form construction default clause will be limited to the clause set out in this section.
14. FPR 1-8.700-2(b) (5).
15. See, subparagraph (a) (i) of the standard clause. There is some disagreement
among the termination experts as to whether or not the default clause makes time of
the essence. For example see Coons, Whelan, Default Termination of Defense Depart-
ment Fixed-Price Supply Contracts, 32 NoTRE DAME LAW. 189 (1957), in which it is
stated on p. 191:
First of all, the provision permitting default termination for the slightest delay
beyond the specified delivery time obviously makes time "of the essence" in all
contracts, even where timely delivery seems of little importance. Thus the con-
tractor is held to a higher standard of performance as regards time than in the
usual private contract where, absent any express provision, the apparent urgency
of the need for the goods would govern the materiality of the delays in delivery.
This statement is contrasted with the following statement in Risik, Defaults In Federal
(Sovermnent Contracts, 14 FED. B.J. 339 (1954) at p. 348: "In contracts for supplies
or services, the current view is that time is not of the essence unless it is apparent
from all the facts and circumstances that time is a material factor." We are inclined
to agree with the Coons-Whelan views.
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any of the other provisions of the contract,' or (3) failure to make
progress so as to endanger performance in accordance with the contract
terms.
17
When a contractor is in default, the default clause vests in the Gov-
ernment the discretion as to whether to terminate the contract.' In
determining whether the contract should be terminated for default, the
contracting officer is required to take the following factors into con-
sideration:
1. The provisions of the contract and applicable laws and regulations;
2. The specific failure of the contractor and the excuses, if any, made
by the contractor for such failure;
3. The availability of the supplies or services from other sources;
4. The urgency of the need for the supplies or services and the period
of time which would be required to obtain the supplies or services
from other sources as compared with the time in which delivery
could be obtained from the delinquent contractor;
5. The degree of essentiality of the contractor in the Government
procurement program and the effect of a termination for default
upon the contractor's capability as a supplier under other contracts;
6. The effect of a termination for default on the ability of the con-
tractor to liquidate guaranteed loans, progress payments, or advance
payments;
7. The availability of funds to finance repurchase costs which may
prove to be uncollectible from the defaulted contractor, and the
availability of funds to finance termination costs if the default is
determined to be excusable; and
16. See subparagraph (a) (ii) of the standard clause. FPR 1-8.602-3 (b) in discussing
subparagraph (a) (ii) uses as an example of a failure to perform any other provision of
the contract the failure to furnish a required performance bond. There is some question
as to whether the default clause substantially alters the common law right permitting
termination by an injured party only where the other party committed a material
breach. Compare Coons and Whelan, supra note 15 at 217 with Risik, supra note 15 at
346-49 and Cuneo, Waiver of the Due Date in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. R-v.
1, 17-18 (1957).
17. See subparagraph (a) (ii) of the standard clause. This provision brings into play
the whole area of anticipatory breach.
18. R. M. Cantrell & Sons, ASBCA No. 7680, 1962 BCA 3320 (1962). In this case
the Armed Services Board, citing Thermo Nuclear Wire Industries, ASBCA No. 6026,
61-1 BCA 2889 (1960), and EI-Tronics, ASBCA Nos. 5501, 5511 and 5512, 60-2 BCA
2712 (1960), stated that it could decide whether under the facts the contract gave the
Government the legal right to terminate the contract for default, but that the Board
could not decide whether or not such right should have been exercised.
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8. Any other pertinent facts and circumstances.1 9
Additionally, the alternatives to a default termination should be taken
into consideration. These are set out in the FPRs ° as, (1) continuance
of contract performance either through the contractor or his surety
or guarantor under ,a revised delivery schedule, (2) continuance of
contract performance through a subcontractor or other acceptable
third party provided the rights of the Government are adequately
preserved, and (3) a no-cost termination if the supplies are no longer
needed and the contractor is not liable to the Government for damages.2
If the contracting officer determines that a default termination is the
proper course of action and the default was due to a failure to meet the
delivery schedule,2 the contracting officer should issue a termination
notice informing the contractor that his right to proceed with contract
performance is terminated23
The Government has a reasonable time from the delivery date within
19. FPR 1-8.602-3 (c). See ASPR 8-602.3 which provides for a consideration of essen-
tially the same factors with the exception of (7) which is not included in the ASPR.
20. FPR 1-8.602-4.
21. FPR 1-8.602-7 discusses the damages which the contractor might be liable for.
22. The Government does not have to wait until the last delivery date has passed
but can terminate a contract for default when a contractor fails to meet any one of
a scheduled series of delivery dates. Delmar Mills, Inc., ASBCA No. 6138, 61-1 BCA
2910 (1961).
23. FPR 1-8.602-3 (d) sets out in detail the contents of the notice of termination for
default as follows:
(1) Set forth the contract number and date;
(2) Describe the acts or omissions constituting the default;
(3) State that the contractor's right to proceed further with performance of the
contract (or a specified portion of the contract) is terminated;
(4) If the contracting officer has not determined whether the failure to perform is
excusable, state that the supplies or services terminated may be procured
against the contractor's account, and that the contractor may be held liable
for any excess costs;
(5) If the contracting officer has determined that the failure to perform is not
excusable, state that the notice of termination constitutes such decision and
state that the contractor will be held liable for any excess costs, and also
state that the contractor has the right to appeal such decision under the
Disputes clause;
(6) State that the Government reserves all rights and remedies provided by law
or under the contract, in addition to charging excess costs; and
(7) State that the notice constitutes a decision that the contractor is in default




which to issue a notice of termination 4 When the Government fails to
issue a notice of termination the facts occurring after the passage of the
delivery date will have to be examined in order to determine whether
there has been a waiver of the delivery date. 5 Probably the most
prevalent act of waiver is acceptance of delivery after the delivery
date.28 Requests by the Government for the contractor to continue
performance,27 and requests for the contractor to take other action
after the delivery date28 also have been held to constitute a waiver. If a
waiver has taken place, a new delivery schedule must be established and
must be reasonable under the facts.2 When the Government establishes
a new delivery date, the Government must notify the contractor of
such date.30
Where the decision to terminate the contract is based on a failure to
perform other contract provisions or a failure to make progress, the
24. 43 Comp. Gen. 1 (1963). In this decision the Comptroller General stated at
p. 4:
There seems to be no doubt that the Government has a reasonable length of time,
usually referred to as 'forebearance', after a contractor's failure to make timely
delivery, within which to make up its mind whether or not to terminate for
default. The contractor's actions after the date deliveries are delinquent, such
as the purchase of additional tooling or materials, continued production, or partial
deliveries, may, if known to the Government, operate to shorten the time which
will be considered a reasonable forebearance period, but it seems to us that in
the absence of affirmative action by the Government which can be construed as
encouragement to the contractor to continue its efforts to deliver, this can be
their only effect.
See Midwest Engineering, ASBCA No. 5390, 1962 BCA 3640 (1962) in which a 56-day
period of forebearance was held not to constitute a waiver.
25. See Associated Aircraft, ASBCA No. 7255, 1963 BCA 3739 (1963) (Acceptance
Inspection); Industrial Chamberheat, ASBCA No. 6128, 61-1 BCA 2883 (1961). (Accept-
ance of Samples); Goodrich Co, ASBCA No. 2760, 58-1 BCA 1624 (1958).
26. Industrial Chamberheat Laboratories, ASBCA No. 6182, 61-1 BCA 2883 (1960);
Engineering Enterprise, Inc., ASBCA No. 5527, 60-1 BCA 2647 (1960); Nutt Mfg. Co,
ASBCA No. 3594, 57-2 BCA 1480 (1957).
27. See Fleet Services Specialties Co, ASBCA No. 2461, 58-2 BCA 1850 (1958).
28. Clad International Corp, ASBCA No. 4813, 59-2 BCA 2385 (1959); Resolute
Paper Products Corp, ASBCA No. 3670, 57-2 BCA 1432 (1957).
29. See L. W. Foster Sportswear Co, Inc, ASBCA No. 5754, 1962 BCA 3364 (1962).
Lumen, Inc, ASBCA No. 6431, 61-2 BCA 3210 (1961); Caskel Forge, Inc, ASBCA No.
6205, 60-2 BCA 2718 (1960).
30. In Lumen, Inc, ASBCA No. 6431, 61-2 BCA 3210 (1961) the Armed Services
Board quoted the following rule:
The rule is well settled that, where time of performance is waived, 'neither
party can thereafter rescind the contract on account of such delay without notice
to the other, requiring performance within a reasonable time, to be specified in
the notice or the contract would be abrogated'.
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default clause requires a notice from the contracting officer specifying
such failure and a minimum of 10 days in which the contractor may
"cure" the failure. The contract clause does not require that the notice
be in writing if the minimum period of 10 days is given to cure the
defective performance, but does require that the granting of a period
longer than 10 days be in writing. However, it has been held that the
cure notice must be in writing.31
Although the cure notice may appear to be a rather innocuous
requirement, the contents of such a notice may spell out the difference
between a valid default termination and one that is invalid. For
example, where the notice is issued and the defect cured, the notice
will not remain as the basis for default where new reasons arise.3s In
addition, where the notice does not set forth the defects with some
degree of specificity, it may be considered to be inadequate to support
the default termination. 34
A contractor will not be permitted to take advantage of a failure
to issue a "cure" notice where the contractor has knowingly delivered
31. Fitzhenry-Guptill Co., ASBCA 1885 (1956). Although FPR 1-8.602-3 does not
specifically require that the notice be in writing it does appear to contemplate a writing.
32. See General Products Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 6522, 61-1 BCA 3003 (1961);
Facs Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 3336, 57-1 BCA 1215 (1957). FPR 1-8.602-3(b) pro-
vides that the 10-day notice shall set forth all the contract provisions the contractor
failed to meet, or a summary of the findings which demonstrate that the contractor
has failed to make acceptable progress. If previous correspondence is relied on it should
be specifically referenced in the cure notice. In addition the cure notice should state
that the contract may be terminated if the defect is not cured within 10 days or such
longer period as the contracting officer allows, inform the contractor of his contractual
liabilities in the event of a default termination, request an explanation from the con-
tractor, state that failure to provide an explanation may be treated as if no explanation
exists and invite the contractor to discuss the matter at a conference.
33. Crown-Lee Corp., ASBCA No. 7644, 1962 BCA 3540 (1962).
34. See Valley Contractors, ASBCA No. 9547, 1964 BCA 4071 in which the following
cure notice was held to be inadequate:
It is requested that you submit to the undersigned Contracting Officer within
ten (10) days from the date of receipt hereof any facts or circumstances which
you believe excuse your failure to perform. You are further notified that the
Government considers your failure to make progress toward completion a con-
dition that is endangering performance of the remainder of the contract in ac-
cordance with its terms. Therefore, unless such condition is cured within ten
(10) days after receipt hereof the Government may terminate subject contract
in its entirety for default under General Provision No. 7 (Default). Your atten-
tion is invited to the respective rights of the contractor and the Government
under General Provision No. 7 (Default), and the liabilities that may be invoked
in the event a decision is made to terminate for default of the contractor.
Compare with Midwest Engineering and Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 5801, 1962
BCA 3289 (1962) in which the Board held the following cure notice was adequate to
[Vol. 7:225
1966] GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
nonconforming units in an attempt to meet a delivery schedule 5
Furthermore, where there has been a repudiation of the contract no
cure notice is required.36
The determination of whether or not the contractor has failed to make
progress so as to endanger performance of the contract is essentially a
factual one. The determination of actual failure to perform at one
extreme and anticipatory repudiation at the other extreme is relatively
easy to make.37 The "in-between" situation presents a more difficult
problem. This is true because of the absence of a specific standard of
progress by which performance can be measured.38 Once a proper
sustain the appeal:
It is apparent from the status of the preproduction testing that you are failing to
make such progress under this contract as will enable you to deliver 25 Generator
Sets during the month of April 1959, as required by the contract. If you do
not within ten (10) days after receipt of this warning notice cure such failure....
35. Shallcross Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 8726, 65-1 BCA 4594 (1964). In this case the
contractor was required to deliver certain units over a period of time. The contractor
delivered most of the units required by the first delivery date. Prior to the second
delivery date the contract was terminated for default. The contractor argued that
since he had not received a cure notice "under the second branch of the 'default'
clause the termination was ineffective." After pointing out that the contractor
knew at the time of delivery, without disclosing the fact, that all the units
did not conform to specifications, the Board rather tersely rejected the contractor's
argument that it was entitled to a cure notice.
36. Warren Haddock, ASBCA No. 7742, 1962 BCA 33470 (1962). See Speidel, Default
For Failure to Make Progress, The Government Contractor Briefing Papers No. 64-5
(Oct. 1964).
37. Emphasis is placed on the word "relatively" since any determination involving
disagreeing parties can be difficult. For a good discussion of anticipatory repudiation
see Dec. Comp. Gen. B-146361 (Sept. 29, 1961) affirmed 41 Comp. Gen. 382 (1961). In
affirming its earlier decision the Comptroller General stated:
Under the prevailing legal authorities, a positive statement by the promisor to the
promisee that the promisor cannot perform, is sufficient to constitute an anticipa-
tory repudiation which is a total breach of contract .... It is unnecessary that
the promisor in such case state that he is unwilling to perform for he makes it
clear that he in fact will not perform.
See also Northeastern Engineering, Inc., ASBCA No. 6504, 61-2 BCA 3108 (1961) in
which the Armed Services Board converted an improper default termination into a
termination for convenience where the contractor notified the contracting officer that
delivery would be delayed beyond the contract delivery date because of testing delay.
In rejecting this notification as anticipatory repudiation the Board stated that "there
must be a definite and unequivocal manifestation of intention on the part of the re-
pudiator that he will not render the promised performance when the time fixed for
it in the contract arrives. See generally Fairbanks & Speidel, Anticipatory Repudiation
-Contracting Officers Dilemma, 6 Mm. L. REv. 129 (1959).
38. In Manhattan Lighting Equipment Co., Inc, ASBCA No. 5113, 60-1 BCA 2646
(1960) the Government attempted to prove a standard of required work progress by
reference to previous procurements of the same item. The Board in rejecting the con-
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standard of progress is ascertained it must then be determined whether
contract performance has been endangered.89 Therefore, the factual
situation becomes particularly acute.40
EXCUSABLE DELAY
Paragraph (c) of the default clause excuses the contractor from
liability for excess costs "if the failure to perform the contract arises
out of causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence
of the contractor." Examples of acts which may be included within
such causes are then set forth in the contract;41 however, these causes
are not all-inclusive.4
At one time there was some question as to whether a contractor
suffering from one of the enumerated causes was required to show that
the cause was beyond its control and without its fault or negligence.
This problem was laid to rest by the Supreme Court in United States v.
tention of the Government, apparently for lack of proof stated:
The Government has attempted to prove a standard of progress by reference to
its procurement of the same item on prior occasions. The contracts in all of
such cases except one provided for delivery after longer periods, of varying
length, after the date of contract than the period of 90 days between the date
of the subject contract and the specified delivery date of 19 March 1958. Even
if Appellant were chargeable with knowledge of the facts concerning the other
procurements, a proposition which the Government's evidence does not establish,
they would not prove a standard of progress in the absence of evidence, missing
here, that the longer periods are inherently attributable to necessity and not to
the election of the parties to stipulate the longer periods for other reasons.
39. See Government Contracts Practice, p. 470 (1964).
40. See Manhattan Lighting Equipment Co, Inc, ASBCA No. 5113, 60-1 BCA 2646
(1960) in which default termination was held improper and General Products Co.
ASBCA No. 6522, 61-1 BCA 3003 (1961) in which the default termination was sus-
tained.
41. The second sentence of paragraph (c) provides:
Such causes may include, but are not restricted to, acts of God or of the public
enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractural capacity,
fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and
unusually severe weather; but in every case the failure to perform must be beyond
the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor.
42. The clause makes it very clear that the enumerated causes are only examples.
See Risik, supra note 15, at 351 where it is stated:
Despite the plain words of the default clauses there is some inevitable confusion
as to whether the list of excusable clauses [sic] is all inclusive. . . . Excusable
causes are not limited to those specifically mentioned in the contract clause.
In addition the excuse for nonperformance need not be of the same kind or class of
excuse as those enumerated. Seaboard & W. Airlines, Inc, ASBCA No. 4650 (1958);
But see Austin Co. v. U.S, 314 F.2d 518 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
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Brooks-Callaway Co.43 In addition, administrative action has eliminated
the need for court interpretation by following the enumerated causes
with the statement "but in every case the failure to perform must be
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the con-
tractor."
Acts of the Government which may excuse the contractor's failure
to perform include a multitude of "sins." For example, failure of the
Government to make required payments to the contractor," delays in
the issuance of approvals,4 improper inspection,46 defective or late
Government furnished material,47-all will serve to excuse the con-
tractor's failure to perform.
Among the other enumerated causes of failure to perform, the one
based on the weather is one of those most frequently litigated.48  The
term "unusually severe weather" as used in the default article does not
43. 318 U. S. 120 (1943). Although the court here was concerned with the interpre-
tation of the standard form of default article used in construction contracts which in
addition to requiring the excusable delay to be beyond the control and without the
fault or negligence of the contractor, required it to be unforeseeable. The court con-
cluded that the enumerated excusable causes were required to be unforeseeable and
beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. The court
pointed out the absurd results which could arise were another rule to apply as follows:
If fire is always an excuse, a contractor is free to use inflammable materials in a
tinder-box factory and escape any damages for delay due to a resulting fire. Any
contractor could shut his eyes to the extremist probability that any of the listed
events might occur, submit a low bid, and then take his own good time to furnish
the work free of the compulsion of mounting damages, thus making the time
fixed for completion practically meaningless and depriving the Government of all
recompense for the delay.
44. See United States Services Corp., ASBCA No. 8291, 1963 BCA 3703 (1963);
Q.V-S, Inc, ASBCA No. 3722, 58-2 BCA 2007 (1958); George E. Martin & Co., ASBCA
No. 3117, 56-2 BCA 1150 (1956). In Douglas Corp, ASBCA No. 3349, 58-1 ]CA 1727
(1958) the Armed Services Board considered the failure of the Government to make
payment under one contract an excuse for the contractor's failure to proceed under
other contracts. However where there is a bona fide disagreement as to right to
payment or amount due the failure of the Government to make payment will not be
considered an excusable cause. Precision Tool Co, Inc, ASBCA No. 5048, 60-2 BCA
2739 (1960); Aircraftsmen Co., ASBCA No. 3592, 58-1 BCA 1667 (1958).
45. Remsel Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 5899, 61-1 BCA 2909 (1960); Blanchard Con-
struction Co, ASBCA No. 4457, 59-1 BCA 2146 (1959).
46. United States v. Adams, 160 F. Supp. 143 (W.D. Ark. 1958); Roy K. Hubbard,
ASBCA No. 5892, 60-2 BCA 2740 (1960).
47. Schutter Industries Co, ASBCA No. 3867, 59-2 BCA 2390 (1959); Douglas Corp,
ASBCA No. 3349, 58-1 BCA 1727 (1958); Maxwell Coil Co, ASBCA No. 3852, 58-1 BCA
1749 (1958).
48. An entire briefing paper was devoted solely to "weather" and its effect on con-
tract performance. See Crowell, Dees, The Weather, The Government Contractor
Briefing Papers, No. 65-4 (Aug. 1965).
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include all weather which prevents performance. 49  Rather, emphasis
should be placed on the word "unusually" which contemplates some-
thing which is not reasonably to be expected. 0
Failure of performance caused by the default of a subcontractor will
relieve the prime contractor from liability for excess costs if the default
of the subcontractor "arises out of causes beyond the control of both
the contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence
of either of them." 51 The quoted portion of the default clause was
added as the result of a difference in decisions rendered by the Comp-
troller General and the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
The Armed Services Board, in John Andresen & Co., Inc., 52 held that
a contractor's failure to perform was excusable if it resulted solely
from delay caused by its subcontractor, even though the subcontractor
might have been at fault. The Comptroller General in a 1959 decision '
rejected the Andresen doctrine and held that under the Default article
in both the Government's Standard Form 32, fixed-price supply contract
(Nov. 1949 Ed.) and the comparable article in the Standard Form 23A
fixed-price construction contract, the prime contractor could be ex-
cused for delays caused by a subcontractor's failure to perform only if
the subcontractor in addition to the prime contractor was free from
fault.54
In order for the default of the subcontractor to excuse the prime
contractor from the assessment of excess costs, the default clause imposes
49. Lee Moulding Construction Co., IBCA 153, 61-1 BCA 2977 (1961); Montgomery
Construction Corp., ASBCA No. 5000, 59-1 BCA 2211 (1959).
50. 14 Comp. Gen. 431 (1934); J. W. Merz, IBCA 64, 59-1 BCA 2086 (1959).
51. See Alert Products, Inc, ASBCA No. 5620, 59-2 BCA 2422 (1959) which was
the first case involving failure of performance due to actions of a subcontractor under
this language.
52. ASBCA No. 633 (1950).
58. Dec. Comp. Gen. B-140166 (Oct. 30, 1959). In earlier decisions the Comptroller
General had followed Andresen. See Dec. Comp. Gen. B-120505 (June 19, 1956) and
B-134892 (Feb. 7, 1958). However on March 5, 1958 the Court of Claims in Whitlock
Corporation v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 602 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. den., 358 U.S. 815
(1958) held that prime's default could be excused only if the default of the subcontrac-
tor was beyond its fault or negligence. In its 1959 decision the Comptroller General said
he could find no reason for not following Wbitlock.
54. Under the revised contract language the Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals has abandoned the Andresen doctrine. See Alert Products, Inc, ASBCA No.
5620, 59-2 BCA 2422 (1959). In Federal Television Corp., ASBCA No. 9836, 1964 BCA
4392 the Board held that the default clause excuses the prime only when the default is
without the fault or negligence of both the prime contractor and the subcontractor
and the clause contains no exception for situations involving a sale source subcontractor
(the- drawing furnished by the Government did not supply sufficient data to permit
manufacture by any source other than the subcontractor).
[Vol. 7:225
1966] GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
the additional condition that the supplies or services to be furnished
by the subcontractor were not "obtainable from other sources in
sufficient time to permit the contractor to meet the required delivery
schedule." This condition is not imposed by the contract language
where no subcontractor is involved. However, it would seem reasonable
to require a contractor who is unable to provide the supplies or services
to procure them in the open market where it is possible and where the
delivery schedule would permit.55
REPURCHASE
Paragraph (b) of the standard clause permits the Government to
procure supplies or services "similar" to those terminated and assess
liability for such supplies or services against the *contractor. The clause
further provides that the repurchase may be on such terms and in such
manner as the Contracting Officer deems appropriate 6 However, this
does not relieve the Government from the duty to mitigate damages.57
For example, the Government is not free to purchase from a higher
bidder where lower bidders are known.58 Even where there is an urgent
need for the supplies the Government may restrict its selection of
bidders.59
The repurchased supplies must be as similar and as practical as those
terminated in quality, unit and specifications.0 0 However, they do not
have to be identical. 61 Also repurchase must be made within a reasonable
time after termination.6
55. See A. M. Loveman Lumber & Box Co, ASBCA No. 3029 (March 26, 1956).
56. The repurchase may be by formal advertising, negotiation or a combination there-
of, whichever the Contracting Officer deems to be in the best interest of the Govern-
ment and whichever protects the interest of the defaulted contractor. Standard En-
gineering and Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 3733, 57-2 BCA 1477 (1957), recon. den,
57-2 BCA 1568 (1957), But See FPR 1-8.602-6 which requires the use of formal adver-
tising except where there is good reason to negotiate.
57. Bar-Ray Products, Inc, ASBCA No. 3065, 57-2 BCA 1502 (1957).
58. Manhattan Lighting Equipment Co, Inc, ASBCA No. 7419, 61-2 BCA 3223 (1961);
Firth Machine & Tool Inc, ASBCA No. 4600, 59-2 BCA 2295 (1959).
59. Lester Bros. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 536 (1960); H & H Manufacturing Co,
ASBCA No. 4353, 60-1 BCA 2621 (1960).
60. Naples Food Products Co, ASBCA No. 8191, 1963, BCA 3932 (1963) (canned
turkey not similar to canned chicken); Lome Electronics, ASBCA No. 9642, 1963 RCA
3833 (1963) (telemetry equipment with relaxed specifications no longer requiring solid
state components-not similar); Midwest Engineering, ASBCA No. 5390, 1962 BCA
3460 (1962) (110 minor changes in basic specifications-repurchase was similar).
61. Associated Traders, Inc. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 502 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Superior
Fuse, ASBCA No. 7756, 1963 BCA 3639 (1963).
62. Rumley v. United States, 285 F.2d 773 (Ct. Cl. 1961) (6 months held to be un-
reasonable); Consolidated Airborne, ASBCA No. 5498, 61-1 BCA 2933 (1961) (5 months
held to be reasonable); Standard Engineering and Manufacturing Co, ASBCA No.
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The excess costs for which the defaulted contractor may be liable are
usually fixed as of the time the repurchase contract is made.63 The
defaulted contractor is not liable for additional costs resulting from the
default of the repurchase contractor and a second repurchase at a
higher price, but is entitled to a reduction of the costs assessed against
him by the difference in the amounts of the two repurchase contracts
if the amount of the second repurchase contract is less than the first.,4
In addition to the right to repurchase at the expense of the defaulted
contractor the default clause reserves to the Government all other
"rights and remedies provided by law or under this contract." "I If no
repurchase is made the Government is entitled to the difference between
the contract price and the market value at the time of breach.6 This
is true even though the Government has lost its right of reprocurement
because of its tardiness in making the reprocurement. 67
ERRONEous TERMINATION
If after the notice of termination has been issued it is determined
that the contractor was not in default or that the default was excusable,
and the contract contains a termination for convenience clause the rights
and obligations of the parties must be determined in accordance with
that clause. If after the notice of default is issued it is determined
that the contractor was not in default and there is no termination for
convenience provision in the contract, paragraph (e) provides that the
contract shall be equitably adjusted to compensate for the termination
and the contract modified accordingly. Prior to 1962 the default
clause did not provide for a conversion to a termination for convenience
when it was found that the contractor was not in default, nor did it
provide for an equitable adjustment where the contract did not contain
a termination for convenience clause. Under these circumstances the
Court of Claims in Klein v. United States0 8 held that a termination for
3733, 57-2 BCA 1477 (1957), recon. den., 57-2 BCA 1568 (1957) (2-1/2 months unreason-
able during period of rising prices).
63. 22 Comp. Gen. 1035 (1943).
64. Dec. Comp. Gen. B-108570 (May 20, 1963). For a general discussion see Cuneo,
Government Contracts Handbook 115 (1962).
65. Paragraph (f) of the default clause.
66. 34 Comp. Gen. 347 (1955).
67. Rumley v. United States, supra note 62.
68. The clause under which the court rendered its interpretation reads as follows:
(e) If, after notice of termination of this contract under the provisions of para-
graph (a) of this clause, it is determined that the failure to perform this contract
is due to causes beyond the control and without the fault of [sic] negligence
of the Contractor pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this clause,
such Notice of Default shall be deemed to have been issued pursuant to the
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default was not converted to a termination for convenience where the
Government erroneously terminated the contract for default. The
court reaffirmed its decision in Klein in Goldwasser v. United States.69
In this case the court found that the Government had entered into a
requirements contract which obligated the Government to purchase its
needs from the contractor. The Armed Services Board of Contract
Appeals had so held in a previous proceeding before it and had con-
cluded that the refusal of the Government to purchase its needs from
the contractor constituted a termination for convenience. The Court
rejected this approach stating that the sole ground for the Government's
failure to purchase from the contractor under the requirements contract
was the Government's determination that the contractor had defaulted.
If this were true the court stated that the contractor would not be
entitled to damages. However, the court continued, if the contractor
was not in default the contractor would be entitled to damages "and
not merely a convenience-termination settlement."
On the same day the court handed down its decision in Goldwasser
the court decided John Reiner & Company v. United States.70 In this
case the contracting officer cancelled the contract after the Comptroller
General had ruled that the award of the contract was improper and the
contract should be cancelled. The contractor brought suit for breach
of contract. The court found that the contracting officer did not pur-
port to terminate the contract under the termination for convenience
clause, nor did the contracting officer follow the procedures established
by the clause. However, the Court held the contractor's recovery was
limited by the clause. The court stated that the Government had a
valid ground to invoke the termination for convenience clause and
that the "justifiable cause controls the case and 'operate[s] to curtail
the damages recoverable'.... ,, 71
clause of this contract entitled 'Termination for Convenience of the Government!
and the rights and obligations of the parties hereto shall in such event be governed
by such clause.
The court stated that the quoted paragraph applied only when the failure to perform
was found to be excusable. Therefore the court found that the erroneous termination
for default was a breach of contract and awarded damages to the contractor.
As the result of the Klein case the standard form of termination for default clause
was changed to its present form.
69. 325 F.2d 722 (Ct. CL 1963).
70. 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
71. Id. at 443. The court in Reiner distinguished the Goldwasser situation as follows:
The only holding of the Court (on this point) is that, once the Government
wrongfully terminates for default where there has been no default, it cannot
1966]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
FIxED-PRICE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
The right to terminate a fixed-price construction contract is con-
ditioned upon (1) contractor's refusal or failure to prosecute the work
with such diligence as will insure its completion within the time specified
in the contract, or (2) contractor's failure to complete work within
the time specified in the contract. In either event the Government
may72 by written notice73 terminate the contractor's right to proceed.
Unlike subparagraph (a) (ii) of the supply termination for default clause
no cure notice is required under the default clause of the fixed-price
construction contract.
Whether or not termination is invoked, the contractor will be held
liable for damages for failure to complete performance within the time
specified in the contract. If the contract contains a liquidated damages
provision and if the Government terminates the contract for default,
thereafter seek to avoid liability by invoking a convenience termination. That
holding the court accepts and reaffirms today in Goldwasser v. United States ....
72. As in fixed-price supply article the decision as to whether to terminate the con-
tract is left to the discretion of the Government. The factors to be taken into con-
sideration in making the determination are set out in FPR 1-8.603-3 (a) as follows:
(1) The provisions of the contract and applicable laws and regulations;
(2) The specific failure of the contractor and excuses, if any, made by the contractor
for such failure;
(3) The period of time which would be required for the Government or another
contractor to complete the work as compared to the time required for completion
by the delinquent contractor;
(4) The effect of a termination for default on the ability of the contractor to liquidate
guaranteed loans, progress payments, or advance payments;
(5) The availability of funds to finance the increased cost to complete, to the extent
that such costs may not be covered by surety protection, and the availability of
funds to finance termination costs should it subsequently be determined that the
delay was excusable; and
(6) Any other pertinent facts and circumstances.
73. The contents of the written notice are prescribed by FPR 1-8.603-3 (c) as follows:
(1) Set forth the contract number and date;
(2) Describe the act or omissions, and the extent of the resultant delay, constituting
the default;
(3) State that the contractor's right to proceed further with performance of the
contract (or of a specific portion of the contract) is terminated;
(4) State that the Government may cause the contract to be completed and that the
contractor will be held liable for any increased costs;
(5) State that the Government reserves all rights and remedies provided by law or
under the contract, in addition to charging increased costs;
(6) State that the notice constitutes a decision, pursuant to the Disputes clause, that
the contractor is in default as specified and that the contracting officer has deter-
mined that the delay is not excusable; and




paragraph (b) of the standard clause specifies the resulting damages as
consisting of the liquidated damages until such reasonable time as may
be required for final completion of the work in addition to any increased
costs occasioned the Government in completion of the work. Where
the termination for default clause is not invoked, contractor is liable
under paragraph (c) for the stated liquidated damages until the work
is completed or accepted. 74
Paragraph (d) of the clause provides that the contract shall not be
terminated nor the contractor charged with damages if the delay in the
completion of the work was due to unforeseeable75 causes beyond the
control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor, and if the
contractor within 10 days from the beginning of the delay notifies the
contracting officer in writing of the causes of the delay. As in the
supply contract default clause, specific examples of excusable delay are
set forth.7e Defaults of subcontractors must arise from unforeseeable
causes beyond the control of, and without the fault or negligence of,
both the prime contractor and subcontractor.
74. It is to be noted that when contractor is permitted to complete performance
he is liable for liquidated damages up to the time the work is completed. When con-
tractor is not permitted to complete performance paragraph (b) makes contractor liable
for liquidated damages for such reasonable time as is required for completion. The rem-
edies provided in the construction contract should be compared with those provided in
the supply contract. In both the construction and supply contracts the specific remedies
provided in the default articles are in addition to the rights and remedies provided by
law or under the contract.
75. The requirement that the clause be unforeseeable is not included in the supply
contract clause. There is some question as to whether it imposes any additional re-
striction on the contractor. See for example Coons, Whelan, Default Termination of
Defense Department Fixed-Price Supply Contracts, 32 Nonm DA?,m LA-w. 189, 199-200
(1957), where it is stated:
There is no specific requirement of unforeseeability of delay in the current stand-
ard "default" article used in defense supply contracts. However, in effect, the
tests are identical, for, if the contractor is late in delivering due to delays which,
although beyond his control, are foreseeable, the delinquency is considered to arise
from his own "fault or negligence". If the delays were foreseeable, they should
have been provided for when the contractor made his delivery commitments, and
failure to so provide is negligence.
76. The specific acts which will excuse failure of performance as stated in the default
clause are:
... acts of God, acts of the public enemy, acts of the government in either its
sovereign or contractural capacity, acts of another contractor in the performance
of a contract with the Government, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions,
strikes, freight embargoes, unusually severe weather, or delays of subcontractors or
suppliers....
Although the phrase "including but not restricted to", prefaces the specific acts there
is no language following the acts similar to that contained in the supply contract clause.
See note 41 supra.
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As in the supply contract clause, the construction contract clause
provides for the conversion of a default termination into a convenience
termination if the contract contains a termination for convenience
article and it is determined that the contractor was not in default or
that the delay was excusable. If no termination for convenience clause
is contained in the contract, the contract is to be equitably adjusted
and the contract modified accordingly.Y'
TERMINATIO-N FOR CONVENIENCE
The standard termination for convenience clauses, like the standard
termination for default articles, are set out in the FPRs. 8 The policies
and procedures relating to termination for convenience are set out in
FPR §§ 1-8.2 to 1.8.5.
Termination for convenience clauses uniformly reserve to the Gov-
ernment the right to terminate the contract when it is determined that
such action would be in the best interest of the Government."9 The
determination as to whether the Government's interest80 would best be
served by terminating the contract is a matter within the discretion
of the contracting agency.81 The consent of the contractor is un-
necessary for a valid termination for convenience.n
Even without a termination for convenience clause in the contract,
the Government may terminate the contract for convenience when the
77. In G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), the
Government improperly terminated the contract for default and the contract contained
no termination for convenience clause. The Court of Claims held that since ASPR re-
quired the inclusion of the termination for convenience clause in the contract the
clause was incorporated in the contract by operation of law. For a discussion of
Chrisftian see Cibinic, Contract by Regulation, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 111 (1963).
78. See FPR SS 1-8.701 to 1-8.706. Instructions for the use of the termination for
convenience clause are found in FPR 1-8.700-2 (a).
79. Termination for convenience clauses have been held to be valid and terminations
thereunder do not constitute a breach of contract. Duesenberg Motors Corp. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 115 (1922); Davis Motor Car Co. v. United States, 60 Ct. C. 68 (1924)
affrmed 271 US. 96 (1926).
80. What constitutes the best interests of the Government has been stated to cover
a host of variable and unspecified situations including the direction of the Comptroller
General. John Reiner & Company v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (1963).
81. See 19 Comp. Gen. 826 (1939); 40 Ops. Atty. Gen. 225 (1942). In discussing the
right to terminate a contract for the convenience of the Government, the Court of
Claims in John Reiner & Company v. United States, 325 F.2d 438 (Ct. Cl. 1963) stated:
Under such an all-inclusive clause, the Government has the right to terminate
'at will' . . . and in the absence of bad faith or clear abuse of discretion the
contracting officer's election to terminate is conclusive.
82. See Commonwealth Engineering Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 396 (Ct. Cl.
1960).
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public interest so requires8s However, such a termination would be
considered a breach of contract and would subject the Government to
damages in excess of those recoverable under the termination for
convenience clause."
After the determination is made to terminate the contract, a notice of
termination is sent to the contractor 5 The notice of termination is
required to be in writing and contain (1) a statement that the contract
is being terminated, (2) the effective date of the termination, (3) the
extent of termination and (4) any special instructions."" Upon receipt
of the notice of termination the contractor must comply with the
terms of the notice and the requirement of the contract clause.s The
notice and the contract clause generally require that the contractor
stop work and discontinue placing subcontracts, terminate existing
subcontracts, advise the contracting officer of any special circumstances
preventing the stoppage of work, submit a request for an equitable
adjustment for continued portions if a partial termination is involved,
take action to protect and preserve Government property, notify the
Government of legal proceedings against the contractor by subcon-
tractors arising out of the termination, settle all liabilities and claims
arising out of termination of subcontracts, submit a settlement proposal
and dispose of termination inventory as directed or authorized.
The responsibilities of the contracting officer do not end with the
83. See 29 Comp. Gen. 36 (1949); 18 Comp. Gen. 826 (1939). Foster Wheeler Cor-
poration, IBCA-61, 60-1 BCA 2481 (1960). The 1939 decision of the Comptroller General
is a landmark decision and the language contained therein is worth noting:
It has been held that when the public interest requires such action, a contracting
officer may terminate a contract which he was authorized to make and that he
may, by supplemental agreement, agree with a contractor upon the compensation
to be paid for work already performed, etc, provided the amount agreed is proper
and just and the contractor will accept such amount in full and final settlement
of all rights incident to or arising out of the original and supplemental contracts.
See United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co, 91 U.S. 321; 14 Comp. Gen. 589;
15 id. 134; 21 id. 134; 26 id. 170; and Comp. Gen. 526. The determination as to
whether the public interest requires such termination is a matter for administrative
decision and does not rest with this office which is concerned primarily with the
availability of the appropriation for any expenditure resulting from the termina-
tion.
84. G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963), in which it was stated that anticipatory damages could
be recovered if the action was for breach of contract, but could not be recovered under
the termination for convenience clause.
85. FPR 1-8.202.
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issuance of the termination notice. s8 The contracting officer must
direct the action of the contractor, examine settlement proposals,
negotiate and enter into a settlement agreement, and to the extent
the parties are unable to agree on a settlement, render a contracting
officer's decision on settlement. The FPRss9 require the contracting
officer to seek assistance from specially qualified personnel so that such
personnel may assist in dealings with the contractor, render legal and
accounting advice, and review and dispose of the termination inventory.
The contracting officer is required to hold a conference with the
contractor in order to develop a definite program for effecting settle-
ment.90 The topics to be discussed at this meeting are enumerated in
the FPRs91 and cover the entire termination procedure including a
tentative time schedule for negotiation of a settlement.
Comprehensive regulations, which relate to the settlement with the
prime 'contractor and also to the settlement of subcontractor claims are
provided for the negotiation of the settlement agreements. 92  First
comes the settlement proposa9 3 which must be submitted to the agency
audit office by the contracting officer if it amounts to $2,500 or more. 4
Subcontractor settlement proposals are to be referred to the audit office
if they amount to $25,000 or more or if the contracting officer considers
an accounting review desirable. 5
When a settlement agreement (or determination if the parties are
unable to agree) exceeds a certain amount,. 6 or the contracting officer
or the head of the procuring activity desires review, the contracting
officer shall submit each settlement agreement or determination to a
Settlement Review Board. The function of the Settlement Review
Board is to determine the overall reasonableness of the settlement agree-
88. See FRP 1-8.205.
89. FPR 1-8.205 (b).
90. FPR 1-8.205(c).
91. Ibid.
92. See FPR 1-8.207 through 1-8.213, 1-8.3, 1-8.4. For a thorough discussion of termi-
nation settlements see Gubin, Termination Settlements, Government Contractor Briefing
Papers No. 63-3 (July 1963).
93. The settlement proposal must be submitted within one year after the effective date
of the termination, FPR 1-8.307(a). The settlement proposal is required to cover all
elements of the contractor's claim. There are two bases for settlement proposals. They
are the inventory basis (FPR 1-8.307-2(b)) and the total cost basis (FPR 1-8.307-2(c)).
The preferred basis is the inventory basis but the total cost basis will be acceptable if
the contractor's costs are so recorded as to make it impossible to use the inventory basis.
94. FPR 1-8.207(a).
95. FPR 1-8.207(b).
96. FPR 1-8.211-2(a) (1) and (2) ($50,000 or more).
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ment or determination from the standpoint of protecting the Govern-
ment's interest. 7
Partial payments to the contractor may be made prior to settlement
at any time after submission of interim or final settlement proposalsf3
The extent to which partial payment-shall be made is within the discre-
tion of the contracting officer.
The disposition of termination inventory is provided for in detail
in FPR 1-8.5. Subject to the Government's right to acquire the
termination inventory, it is to be disposed of in the manner most
favorable to the Government. Such disposal may include purchase
or retention by the prime contractor or subcontractor at cost, return
to suppliers, utilization, donation, sale or destruction or abandonment.
The final step in the termination process is the final settlement
agreement. The primary objective 9 is to negotiate a settlement by
agreement which provides fair compensation for the contractor for the
work done and the preparations made for the termination of the con-
tract including a reasonable allowance for profit. In order to attain
this objective both parties must keep in mind that various methods for
arriving at fair compensation may be appropriate and that the "applica-
tion of standards of business judgment as distinguished from strict ac-
counting principles, is the heart of a settlement." 100
In evaluating cost information in the negotiation of a termination
settlement, the principles in Part 1-15 (Cost Principles) or the corres-
ponding agency regulations should be consulted.10 1
Although profit0 2 is to be allowed on work performed, no anticipa-
tory profits are includable in a termination settlement. 0 3 Also no profit
will be allowed if the contractor would have incurred a loss had the
97. FPR 1-8211-3. The Board will give written notification to the Contracting Officer
of its decision. Failure mu render a decision within 30 days after submission of all




100. FPR 1-8.301 (a).
101. FPR 1-8.302. Specific costs which have been discussed in decided cases under the
Armed Services Procurement Regulations are: Q.V.S. Inc, ASBCA No. 7513, 1963 BCA
3699 (legal fees); General Steel Tank Co, ASBCA No. 7245, 61-2 BCA 3098 (G&A);
Serge A. Birn, ASBCA No. 6872, 61-1 BCA 3019 (salaries); Transcendental Aircraft
Corp., ASBCA No. 5823, 61-1 BCA 2952 (storage); Atlas Can Co., ASBCA No. 3381,
60-1 BCA 2651 (Work in Progress); Typo Machine Co, ASBCA No. 4473, 59-1 BCA
2136 (accounting); Nolan Bros., Inc., ASBCA No. 4378, 58-2 BCA 1910 (standby).
102. The factors to be considered in the negotiation of profit are enumerated in
FPR 1-8.303 (b). Profit in settlements by determination is discussed in FPR 1-8.303 (c).
103. FPR 1-8.303 (a).
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entire contract been completed. 104
CONCLUSION
As can be seen from this discussion, termination actions are not simple
matters. They present complex problems which, when not solved by
negotiation between the parties, require resolution by a Board or
possibly a court. The continuing improvements being made in the
termination regulations and clauses will help to reduce the problems
encountered. However, as indicated previously, the field of termina-
tion will never be without its problems.
A BIBLIo.RAPHIcAL NOTE ON TERMINATION
A research of bibliographical materials on termination shows a sur-
prising dearth of law review articles in a field of such importance.
Fortunately, during the past six years there have been several books
published which filled the void. Cuneo's Government Contracts Hand-
book was published in 1962 and devotes pages 112-126 to Default
Termination and pages 127-143 to Termination for the Convenience
of the Government. Similar coverage is given by Paul in his 1964 ALI-
ABA Practice Text on United States Government Contracts & Sub-
contracts, pp. 448-529. In the California Practice Handbook No. 22
on Government Contracts Practice (1964) Walter F. Pettit writes on
Termination: Default, pp. 461-510, and Albert Green and E. K.
Gubin on Termination: Convenience, pp. 513-572. Volume 4 of the
Cyclopedic Guide to Law, Administration and Procedure on Govern-
ment Contracts (1966) by John C. McBride and Isadore H. Wachtel
contains Chapter 30, "Termination For Convenience Of the Govern-
ment" and Chapter 31, "Breach of Contract." Another good tool is
the Defense Contract Termination Guide of the Electronic Industries
Association (1964).
There are two Government publications par excellence: Navy Con-
tract Law (Second Edition, 1959), pp. 233-279 and 1961 Supplement,
pp. 67-71 (Government Printing Office) and Department of The
Army Pamphlet 27-153, Procurement Law, (Headquarters, Department
of The Army; May 1961), pp. 371-431.
Of the 26 articles published from 1952 until now, Risik's is un-
doubtedly the best one. Speidel's papers come up to his usually high
standards. In addition to Gubin's articles, he has also prepared for use




versity of San Francisco, the Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the
College of William and Mary, and the Department of Agriculture
Graduate School) Outlines on Termination which are designed for 3,
6 or 8 hour class presentations and instructions. With his usual gener-
osity, he has allowed the writers to use his outlines. The writers have
heavily profited by this use. Coons-Whelan's article is encyclopedic in
nature and a very practical work of two legal scholars. A listing of
articles which appeared in law reviews from 1952 until January 1, 1966
follows:
Geller, Procurement by Regulation or by Contract? [G. L. Christian
& Associates v. U.S., 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963], 20 N.Y.U. Intra.
L. Rev. 102. (Jan. 1965)
Gallagher, How to Reduce Certain Assets of the Contractor to the
Possession of the Surety after Default or Termination of the Con-
tract, ABA Sec. Ins. N. & C. L. (1964), 64.
Speidel, Default For Failure To Make Progress, Briefing Papers #64-5,
Federal Publications, Inc. (October 1964)
Troll, Chilcott, Rokosz, The Legal Effect of Repurchase Prior to
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